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Venezuela has been in crisis for decades now, and the struggle to restore
democracy has been nothing than linear. Yet, as necessary factors, such as a united
opposition, the pressure from the international community and mass mobilization
come together, democratization does not seem to be too far ahead. Political science
literature has conceptualized transitions as the interval between one political regime
and another. Applying this to probably the most observed transition process today, in
Venezuela transition would imply moving from an authoritarian regime to "something
else", and, in the best of cases, to a democracy. The crucial issue here, is that this
process is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty meaning that the rules
of the game are not set anymore, which is why the main actors, government and
opposition, struggle to define the rules and procedures of that transition and the
subsequent regime.
This uncertainty, however, does not only occur only on an elite level. It is basically
everywhere. Citizens, reporters, IGO’s and NGO’s and even the international
community cannot be certain about what is going on and will happen in the near
future. Ultimately, this leads to wrong or misguided interpretations of the unfolding
transition process. 
A Coup d’État by other means?
One issue being raised, probably to discredit the opposition’s actions, is whether
Guaidó’s swearing in as interim president represents just another Coup d’État
attempt by different means. Let’s review this claim. 
Nicolás Maduro ‘won’ a skewed elections last May, which the opposition decided
to boycott because there was no free and fair electoral contestation or uncertainty
about who would eventually win. As a result, the country’s opposition and large parts
of the international community did not recognize his sham victory. If there was no
legitimate election, there cannot be a legitimate president. In consequence, this
means Maduro’s constitutional term officially ended on January 9, 2019 at midnight. 
As per the Venezuelan constitution, on January 10, a legitimately and democratically
elected president, had to be sworn in. Because Venezuela did not have a duly
elected and democratically legitimate president, the National Assembly declared the
presidency vacant. Following the vacancy of the presidency, and in agreement with
Article 233 of the Venezuelan constitution, the president of the National Assembly,
Guaidó, was sworn in as interim president to call free and fair elections with the end
goal of choosing a new executive.
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Even though it may seem like a minor detail to distinguish between ‘being sworn in
as interim president’ and ‘declaring himself president’ it is essential to do so because
not differentiating implies 1) ignoring the country’s constitutional framework 2) and
getting to the wrong conclusions about what is happening in Venezuela.  
Another instance of US intervention?
Another prevalent narrative is that what is happening in Venezuela is the result of
a US intervention. This false narrative has only two purposes: 1) to discredit the
opposition and 2) give Maduro time to figure out his next steps to hold on to power.
While it is true that the US has had a long history of international intervention in
Latin America, the events that are unfolding in Venezuela right now are not the
result of US intervention or external imposition. Giving all the credit, or blame, to the
Trump administration takes away from Venezuelans’ struggle and sacrifices for re-
establishing democracy. 
International pressure on incumbents to respect democratic norms, sanctions of
violations of international law and support for opposition parties and civil society
groups is often benign. Scholarship has consistently found that international
pressure is often crucial in bringing about democratization. After Venezuela’s clear
move towards full fleshed authoritarianism, economic mismanagement, exponentially
growing humanitarian crisis and mass exodus, the Western hemisphere has decided
to change their discourse. Now world powers, including the EU, the US and Canada
as well as the majority of Latin American countries have recognized Maduro as an
illegitimate president, while also largely backing up Guaidó as interim president.
However, to be clear, this international involvement does not equal international
intervention. These are two different things that both the regime and international
sympathizers have tried to equate. It is true that some transitions to democracy,
as in Central America, have been the result of overt international intervention,
however, that is not what is occurring in Venezuela today. Naming and shaming the
Maduro administration and recognizing and bolstering the legitimacy of Guaidó are
qualitatively different from the military adventures and CIA orchestrated coups of the
20th century.
While we cannot be certain that all actors within the opposition reject a potential
intervention, most members of the opposition and the Venezuelan population
do not want or have asked for international intervention. What they want is clear
international refutation of the Maduro regime’s authoritarian practices, identification
of its lacking legitimacy and diplomatic pressure to finally hold free and fair
elections. 
The efflorescence of the opposition
If we are not witnessing an elite Coup d’État or external imposition of regime change
in Venezuela, what is going on? 
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I would argue that the resurgence of strategic action by a unified opposition and
mass mobilization are key components of the new scenario we are witnessing in
Venezuela today. It is important to recall that previous opposition demobilization,
atomization and demoralization has been largely a result of both Chávez and
Maduro’s targeted actions to prevent a political alternative to emerge. While internal
fights did also lead to a lack of transparency and credibility, repression of protest,
incarceration of opposition leaders and other measures greatly debilitated organized
opposition to the Maduro regime. Today, the opposition is now in better shape for
two reasons. 
First, the fresh leadership has helped to unite a highly fragmented opposition. It is
being led by someone young, seemingly fearless but cautious at the same time. For
the first time, it is the opposition who is setting the rules of the game, which Maduro
and his coalition never saw coming. By being sworn in as president, Guaidó raised
the stakes to a political maximum with the goal of breaking the ruling coalitions. As
the literature on elite bargaining during democratic transition has pointed out, internal
schisms are often central to breaking an incumbent’s hold on power.
In Venezuela, right now, pretty much everything is in the hands of the military, who
until today have been loyal to Maduro for very obvious reasons. Torture, human
rights violations, and corruption are only a few out of many violations they have
committed. Now it is for them to decide whether to follow the constitution and
recognize Guaidó as the legitimate president or to continue under Maduro’s grip. The
way I am describing these dynamics do not reflect the complex reality many officials
are living through. While the high ranks do support Maduro seemingly unconditional,
middle and lower ranks would be willing to flip, particularly after the Amnesty Law
passed by the National Assembly providing all military officials and civilians with
immunity if they help restore democracy. Yet precisely these ranks and their families
have been closely watched, targeted and even jailed over the past months. 
Second, Guaidó has been able to secure widespread support from ordinary
Venezuelans. His strategic moves would not be as challenging, or even credible,
without the support of the thousands of Venezuelans who peacefully took to the
streets on January 23. Despite the misery, hunger and lack of public services that
Venezuelans live through every day, they decisively listened to their new leader
and got together with a very simple demands: the cessation of the usurpation, the
creation of a transitional government and free elections.
Parts of the literature on democratic transitions point to pressure from below. We
know that civil society, labor, middle and upper classes, student movements, in
short, ‘the people’ of a country are an extremely important engine to bring about
transition. 
A sui generis transition
The fact is that the Venezuelan opposition has initiated a sui generis transition
process that Latin America has not seen before, and in fact relying on the country’s
own constitutional framework. This transition is not a Coup d’État or an instance
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of external imposition. Rather it is the result of Venezuelans taking the fate of their
country into their own hands and clamoring for democratic change.
Transition has started. We do not know when it will culminate into an actual visible
regime change but we can assert that finally several factors that political science
scholarship has identified are necessary for transitions, seem to be present in
Venezuela. First, the opposition has recovered its credibility and capacity to mobilize.
Second, thousands and thousands of people have taken to the streets to demand
democracy, despite of past violent repression of protests. Third, international
pressure has helped to delegitimize the Maduro regime and give visibility and
credibility to newly sworn-in president Guaidó. Finally, the dramatic events of the
last few days might lead to defection and internal splits. With all these crucial factors
of coming together, the question no longer is if there is going to be a transition to
democracy in Venezuela but when.
Venezuela is leading the fourth wave of democratization in Latin America. The joint
pressure of a united opposition, hand in hand with the pressure of the international
community and the people, are creating new challenges for the Maduro regime. In
this moment of high uncertainty, the only thing that is in fact certain is that transition
has begun in Venezuela. 
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